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ADAM ROHDE
Abstract. We empirically examine the Biased Expectations Hypothesis, which states
that recent price movements in certain sectors play special roles in the formation of in-
dividuals inflation expectations. Specifically we analyze whether economists rationally
bias their expectations and whether economists and consumers naively bias their ex-
pectations with respect to recent inflation in the food and energy sectors. We develop
theoretical models for both rationally formed and naively formed inflation expecta-
tions. We find that economists do not bias their rationally formed expectations and
that consumers and economists do not naively form inflation expectations. Our results
do not support the Biased Expectations Hypothesis; rather, they reinforce the use of
core measures of inflation in policy making.
1. Introduction
Inflation expectations are used by households and firms in decisions concerning
saving, spending, investing, and long-term labor and financial contracts. Through these
various decisions inflation expectations help determine actual inflation by a↵ecting ag-
gregate demand and price-setting behavior in labor and financial markets. Accordingly,
a central banks ability to achieve price stability depends on the proper understanding
of such expectations and their implications. Central banks track survey measures of
inflation expectations for comparison with internal forecasts of inflation and with long
run inflation targets. As such, understanding the ways in which inflation expectations
are formed is crucial in the implementation of monetary policy.
Factors influencing the formation of inflation expectations include, among other
things, the way in which monetary authorities conduct policy, how well that policy is
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communicated to the public, and the recent history of price movements. A common
view among some policymakers concerning how inflation expectations are formed is that
households place extra emphasis on recent price movements in certain highly visible
sectors. The view is called the Biased Expectation Hypothesis (BEH). This hypothesis
states that recent movements in certain sectoral prices play a special role in the formation
of consumers inflation expectations. Put another way with respect to the food sector,
”the BEH says that economic agents, when forming expectations about
future inflation, place relatively more weight on recent behavior of food
prices than expenditure shares indicate.” 1
Analyzing whether observed inflation expectations are determined in this way is an
important issue for monetary policymakers.
There are at least two ways of understanding this over emphasis of inflation in
certain sectors. The first is a simplistic view of the BEH. Consider the frequency with
which individuals purchase di↵erent goods. The goods that an individual purchases
more often might weigh more heavily in the individuals assessment of the movement
of overall prices recently, as the individual readily recognizes changes in the prices of
these goods. Therefore, price movements in the sectors producing these goods might
disproportionately influence the formation of the individuals expectations for overall
inflation. Food and energy are natural choices for sectors that fit this description of
highly visible goods prices. 2
The second, more sophisticated, interpretation of the BEH has its roots in Van
Duynes 1982 paper: Food Prices, Expectations, and Inflation. He shows how a dis-
proportionate influence of price movements in certain sectors can be consistent with
rationality. Specifically, he develops a simple macroeconomic model in which it is ra-
tional to place weights on sectoral inflation rates that di↵er from the sectors shares in
1Van Duyne, 1982, p. 419
2Another determinant of the di↵ering frequency with which an individual assesses prices of di↵erent
goods could be di↵erences in information costs related to learning about prices in di↵erent sectors.
However, given that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and its components are readily available to the
public, cost di↵erentials for price information across sectors seems unlikely to be very large.
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consumer expenditure. The notion of rational expectations used is that from John Muths
1961 paper, Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, which posits
that price expectations are essentially the same as the predictions of relevant economic
theory. Rational bias, in the context of Van Duynes model and the rest of this paper, is
defined as the use of weights for sectoral inflation other than those reflecting consumer
expenditure shares, when forming inflation expectations rationally; this notion will also
be referred to as rational weighting.
Van Duyne develops a two-sector model of the economy in which the processes for
determination of food supply shocks are serially correlated. Serial correlation means past
shocks help to predict future shocks. Stated di↵erently, serial correlation, resulting from
distributed lags in the adjustments of food prices to changes in raw commodity prices,
allows for individuals to gain understanding of the future of food price shocks.Therefore,
in forming expectations, it is rational for such individuals to place more weight on the
movement of prices in the food sector, as past movements of prices in this sector predict
actual current inflation, while price movements in other sectors are not predictive in this
way. Given that the model holds overall inflation equal to inflation in the manufacturing
sector plus temporary disturbances to the rate of inflation in the food sector, serial
correlation of food price shocks emphasizes the role that changes in inflation in this
sector plays in what can be expected for headline inflation. Thus, it is rational for
economic agents to put more weight on past inflation in the food sector when forming
expectations about current headline inflation. Van Duynes theoretical model produces
an equation for inflation expectations with weights for sectoral inflation di↵erent from
the sectors respective shares in consumer expenditure. Since sectoral shares in consumer
expenditure are the weights used to calculate the CPI, the weights in the model would
be biased away from those that are used in calculating actual inflation.
Using the conclusions of this theoretical framework, Van Duyne employs regres-
sion analysis to evaluate the BEH for food price movements during the period from
1966 through 1977. Here, he addresses whether consumers actually bias their inflation
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expectations. He looks specifically at expectations for inflation from the University of
Michigans survey of consumer expectations. His empirical findings indicate that con-
sumers do not bias their expectations for inflation in the basket of goods used to calcu-
late the CPI away from the expenditure shares of the sectors. Van Duyne was unable
to reject the hypothesis that consumers use weights for food price movements that are
the same as food sectors share in expenditure.
Other authors have studied the relationship between inflation, expectations, and
the movement of prices in particular sectors or of certain commodities. In a recent
working paper, Celasun, Mihet, and Ratnovski (2012), look at the e↵ects of commodity
price movements, specifically oil prices, on both market-based and survey-based mea-
sures of inflation expectations. The market-based measure is implied by the di↵erence
between regular Treasury note and bond yields and Treasury Inflation- Protected Secu-
rity (TIPS) yields. The survey-based measure was, again, the University of Michigans
survey of consumer inflation expectations. The authors found that oil and food price
movements had statistically significant impact on short-term TIPS-based inflation ex-
pectations; they also found that oil prices had an economically significant impact. The
conclusion that sectoral price movements do drive inflation expectations is an important
start toward understanding how inflation expectations are determined and their role in
the determination of actual inflation; however, the paper does not consider whether the
weights placed on such price movements are di↵erent from their respective expenditure
shares. This additional subtlety is vital for monetary authorities to make responsible
policy decisions when interpreting price movements and the importance they give to
price movements across di↵erent sectors. Specifically, the fact that policy makers now
tend to focus on core inflation measures over headline measures could be a mistake, if
the highly variable movements in food and energy prices play emphasized roles in the
determination of inflation expectations that then help determine future actual inflation.
RATIONAL BIAS IN INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 5
2. Research Questions and Analytical Approach
The analysis we conduct in this paper is twofold. We look at the more sophisticated
manifestation of the BEH that uses the serial correlation of price shocks within a gener-
alization of Van Duyne0s algebraic framework, and we investigate directly whether the
weights, used by consumers, to determine inflation expectations di↵er from the sectoral
shares in consumer expenditure, over the period from 1983 to 2012.
As data about consumer expectations for inflation that satisfies the needs of our
theoretical framework, which we develop in the following sections, (i.e. inflation expec-
tations data for two periods in the future) is unavailable from the University of Michigan
survey of consumers, we substitute for the data collected by the Philadelphia Federal Re-
serve Bank about the multi period inflation expectations of professional economists. We
recognize that it is likely that the expectations of professional economists are more Muth
rational than those of consumers, as understanding economic theory is their profession.
However, it is reasonable to think that consumers are not ignorant of basic economic
thinking and that their expectations for inflation would not be drastically di↵erent than
those of the economists, when presented with price movements. In particular, the vital
assumption of serial correlation of price shocks to the food and energy sectors, in the
theory to be developed, is fairly intuitive and could be reasonably assumed to factor into
consumers0 formation of inflation expectations.
First we determine if rationally formed inflation expectations of economists are
biased (taking into account serial correlation of food and energy price shocks). Second
we determine if typical consumers bias their expectations in a simplistic way, that is
they naively use the sectoral shares in consumer expenditure to weight price movements
in the food and energy sectors when forming inflation expectations.
To specify our empirical analysis:
[1] We address whether the expectations formed by economists for inflation in the
food and energy sectors are biased during the period of 1980 through 2012 in accord with
the BEH. Specifically, we examine whether the professional economists surveyed by the
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Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank bias the relative weights they assign to the food and
energy sectors in their expectations for movements in the CPI away from the sectors’
respective shares in consumer expenditure. This analysis is done within a context of
rationally formed inflation expectations.
[2] Further, we address whether the expectations for inflation in the food and en-
ergy sectors formed by typical consumers are biased during the period of 1980 through
2012. Specifically, we examine whether the consumers surveyed by the University of
Michigan bias the relative weights they assign to the food and energy sectors in their ex-
pectations for movements in the CPI away from the sectors’ respective shares in consumer
expenditure. We do this analysis to see if individuals naively use consumer expenditure
shares to form inflation expectations.
In order to address the first relationship, we developed modified versions of Van
Duyne’s theoretical and empirical models, which allow for analysis of the BEH with
respect to food and energy price fluctuations for the period from 1980 through 2012.
For the analysis of naive weighting in individuals0 inflation expectations, there is
little theoretical or algebraic development necessary. A simple algebraic relationship is
arrived at intuitively and an analogous equation is estimated empirically.
For the analysis rational weighting portion of the analysis, we augment the the-
oretical model Van Duyne develops in Food Prices, Expectations, and Inflation so that
simultaneous analysis of expectations for price movements in both the food and the
energy sector is possible. We create a three sector update to Van Duyne’s two sector
simple stochastic model of the inflation process, which allows for analysis of the links
between food price shocks, expectations, and the overall rate of inflation. Finally, we
alter the demand equation and monetary policy rule described in Van Duyne’s model.
His monetary policy rule, which focuses on how the monetary authority of the modeled
economy sets the rate of growth of the nominal money supply, does not capture how
contemporary monetary policy is conducted. While, during the late 1960s and the 1970s,
it was the practice of many monetary authorities to use the growth rate of the money
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supply directly as a primary tool of monetary policy, over the past three decades it has
been common practice for interest rates to be the main tools of monetary policy. As
such, we designed a monetary policy rule that reflects this. Consequently, the demand
equation we use is also changed to close our model containing interest rates.
With this new theoretical framework as a basis, we conduct empirical analysis.
We estimate equations for inflation expectations one quarter in the future, reflecting
their theoretical analogues, using regression analysis. The regressions, as stated above,
analyze the period from the 1980s through the most recent recession. We then use the
coe cients we estimate through the regressions to test for bias of sectoral inflation in
forming expectations for overall inflation in both the rational weighting context and the
naive weighting context.
3. Rational Weighting Theoretical Model
3.1. Overview. The augmented Van Duyne theoretical model contains three goods: a
fixed-price good, called the manufactured good, and two flex-price goods, called the
food and the energy goods. We emphasize the structure of the fixed-price sector, while
we ignore some significant aspects of flex-price sectors.3 However, we retain the vi-
tal aspect of fixprice-flexprice models: there are quick price adjustments in flex-price
markets and sluggish price adjustments in the fixed-price markets. Thus, prices across
the di↵ering sectors are determined in fundamentally di↵erent ways. Specifically, food
and energy prices are subject to serially correlated supply shocks whereas manufactur-
ing price movements are only dependent on wage inflation. It is this di↵erence in how
prices are determined that allows for the conclusion that placing disproportionate rela-
tive weight on recent food and energy price behavior may be Muth rational. Our overall
theoretical approach will follow Van Duyne’s approach.
3.2. Elements from Van Duyne Model. We assume the price of the manufactured
good reflects constant markup on production costs. We use cost of labor as a proxy.
3Explicitly, we do not address the role of commodity stocks in the determination of prices in the flex-price
markets, as Van Duyne does in his model.
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Thus,
[1]Pmt = wt,
where Pmt is the rate of change in the price of the manufactured good and wt is the
economy wide rate of wage inflation. Here, prices in the manufacturing sector change at
the same rate as nominal wages.4
Now the model must address how wage inflation. With wage agreements renegoti-
ated frequently, nominal wages rise at rate of expected inflation, adjusted for aggregate
demand:
[2]w⇤t =  a0Ut + Et 1Pt
where w⇤t is the rate of wage inflation during period t in the absence of multi-period
contracts, Ut is the deviation of the actual unemployment rate from the natural rate of
unemployment, which is a measure of demand pressure in labor markets, and Et 1Pt is
the expected rate of inflation in period t   1 for period t; a0 and all parameters of the
model are positive. Given multi-period wage contracts, actual wage inflation adjusts to
w⇤t slowly. Therefore,
[3]wt   wt 1 = a2(w⇤t   wt 1)
where 0 < a2 < 1 is a parameter summarizing the degree of inertia in the wage formation
process. Here a smaller value for the parameter a2 implies more sluggish adjustments
of wage inflation to changes in expectations or changes in demand. If we combine the
equations [2] and [3], we get
[4]wt =  a1Ut + a2Et 1Pt + [1  a2]wt 1, a1 = a0a2.
Since, in reality, wage contracts span several periods, Et 1Pt should be interpreted as
expectations of inflation several periods into the future. These equations, taken directly
from Van Duyne’s theoretical model, summarize the way in which wage inflation is
4In order to keep the model manageable, we ignore adjustment lags and other costs of production. Such
costs include those for capital and raw materials. Further, we assume productivity growth is zero in this
model, paralleling Van Duyne’s paper.
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determined within the model. Hence, the rate of inflation in the manufacturing sector
is also determined.
3.3. Alterations to Van Duyne Model. Let us first address how we determine head-
line inflation in the model with three sectors. We can write overall rate of inflation in
the economy as a weighted average of the inflation observed in the three sectors of the
economy:
[6]Pt = AP
x
t +BP
f
t + (1 A B)Pmt
where 0 < A,B < 1, A+B 6= 1. Pt is the overall rate of inflation in the economy. A, B,
and (1 A B) are fixed weights reflecting the shares of energy, food, and manufacturing
in consumer expenditures. P xt is the rate of inflation in the energy sector and P
f
t is the
rate of inflation in the food sector. This method of modeling headline inflation is similar
to the way in which the CPI is calculated. Note, as shown below, we assume that
shocks to inflation in the food and energy sectors a↵ect inflation in wages only through
expectations.
Now, consider the two flex-price sectors of the model economy. Here augmentations
to Van Duyne’s model must be made to adapt it to generalize to three sectors instead of
two. In a stationary economy, barring unequal long term rates of technological progress
across sectors, rates of inflation should be equal in the di↵erent sectors in the long term.
However, as this paper focuses on the short run, inflation in the energy and food sectors
can deviate from inflation in the manufacturing sector due to exogenous supply shocks.
Thus,
[7.1]P xt = P
m
t +  t, [7.2]P
f
t = P
m
t + ✏t
where  t represents a temporary disturbance in the rate of change of energy prices and ✏t
represents a temporary disturbances in the rate of change of food prices. These supply
shocks may be serially correlated giving
[8.1] t =   t 1 + ⌫t, [8.2]✏t =  ✏t 1 + ⌧t
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where | |, | | < 1, ⌫t is a white noise process for the energy sector, and ⌧t is a white noise
process for the food sector. Such shocks could be serially correlated if prices adjust with
distributed lags to changes in raw commodity prices. Serial correlation allows for past
shocks to help predict current price movements. Since past movements of prices in these
sectors predict current inflation, it is rational for economic agents to place more weight
on the movement of prices in the food sector when forming expectations about inflation.
Combining [6], [7.1], and [7.2] produces
[9]Pt = P
m
t +A t +B✏t.
This states that, apart for temporary disturbances in the prices of food and energy,
the current rate of overall inflation is determined by manufacturing price trends. Serial
correlation of food and energy price shocks emphasize the role that price movements
in these sectors play in what can be expected for headline inflation. Through equa-
tions [8.1],[8.2], and [9], we see the unexpected conclusion that rational economic agents
will put more weight on past inflation in the food and energy sectors, when forming
expectations about current headline inflation.
3.4. Closing the Model. Two equations describing the demand side of the economy
are still required. The first summarizes demand and states that the gap between observed
unemployment and the natural rate of unemployment is a function of the nominal interest
rate minus expectations for inflation one period in the future minus the natural rate of
interest. Hence,
[10]Ut = a3[it   EtPt+1   ⇢]
where a3 > 0, it is the nominal interest rate, and ⇢ is the natural rate of interest, which
is similar to the world interest rate.Observe that
rt = it   EtPt+1,
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where rt is the real interest rate, is the Fisher Equation. Therefore, this demand equation
essentially states that the unemployment gap is a function of the real interest rate gap.
The second equation is a monetary policy rule modeled as a version of a Taylor Rule:
[11]it = Pt + ⇢+ ✓1[Pt   P ⇤]  ✓2Ut,
where P ⇤ is the monetary authority’s target for inflation, ✓1 measures the degree to which
the monetary authority accommodates inflationary shocks, and ✓2 measures the degree to
which the monetary authority accommodates demand shocks. This equation states that
the nominal interest rate is a function of the overall rate of inflation, the natural rate of
interest, the deviation of inflation from the monetary authority’s target for inflation, and
the unemployment gap. This monetary policy rule reflects the way most contemporary
monetary authorities conduct monetary policy, namely through interest rates. Both
of these equations are adapted versions of equations from N. Gregory Mankiw’s text
Macroeconomics. Our augmented version of Van Duyne’s theoretical model, generalized
to a three sector economy, is now complete.
3.5. Algebraic Progression and Results of Model. We need an equation for infla-
tion expectations in period t for period t+1 is needed to see how expectations in period
t can be biased by the weights assigned to sectoral inflation. This section will illustrate
”the paradoxical result that rational expectations in this model are bi-
ased, not in the statistical sense, but in the sense that the optimum
weights used to combine sectoral inflation rates are not proportional to
expenditure shares.” (Van Duyne 423)
This relation can be found through the algebraic interactions of the equations of the the-
oretical model. Again, economic actors are Muth rational when they know the structure
of the economy described in the model, know all endogenous variables realized in period
t, waste none of this information, and assume all other actors do the same.
RATIONAL BIAS IN INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 12
Substituting [11] into [10] yields
[12]Ut =
a3 + a3✓1
1 + a3✓2
Pt   a3✓1
1 + a3✓2
P ⇤   a3
1 + a3✓2
EtPt+1,
an equation for the unemployment gap including inflation, target inflation, and inflation
expectations.
Combining [4], [9], and [12] gives
[13]Pt =
a1a3✓1
Z
P ⇤+
a1a3
Z
EtPt+1+
(1  a2)(1 + a3✓2)
Z
wt 1+
A(1 + a3✓2)
Z
 t+
B(1 + a3✓2)
Z
✏t,
where Z = (1   a2)(1 + a3✓2) + [a1a3(1 + ✓1)]. Here, inflation is a function of target
inflation, expectations, wage inflation, and temporary disturbances in inflation in the
food and energy sectors.
Taking expectations in period t for period t+ 1 of equation [13] produces
[14]EtPt+1 =
a1a3✓1
Z
P ⇤+
a1a3
Z
EtPt+2+
(1  a2)(1 + a3✓2)
Z
wt+
A(1 + a3✓2)
Z
Et t+1+
B(1 + a3✓2)
Z
Et✏t+1,
an equation for inflation expectations. However, this is not the equation that is needed,
as it does not yet show expectations as a function of past sectoral inflation rates.
Given the mathematical results
[a]wt = P
m
t , [b]Et t+1 =   t =  [P
x
t   Pmt ],
and
[c]Et✏t+1 =  ✏t =  [P
f
t   Pmt ],
we see that
[15]EtPt+1 =
a1a3✓1
Z
P ⇤ +
a1a3
Z
EtPt+2+
 A(1 + a3✓2)
Z
P xt +
 B(1 + a3✓2)
Z
P ft +
(1  a2    A   B)(1 + a3✓2)
Z
Pmt .
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Rational expectations for inflation one period in the future are a function of a weighted
sum of sectoral inflation rates with weights that, generally, di↵er from sectoral expen-
diture shares. These weights do not sum to one. The serial correlation of the shocks
to the food and energy sectors allow for expectations of inflation to be expressed as
such a function of past sectoral inflation rates. We now see the intuition for weights on
sectoral inflation unequal to expenditure shares borne out algebraically. Expectations
one period in the future are also a function of expectations two periods in the future
and the monetary authority’s target for inflation.
To make this equation clearer, let
↵⇤ =
 A
1  a2 , 
⇤ =
 B
1  a2 , ⇣ =
(1  a2)(1  a3✓2)
Z
.
In combination with [15] these give
[16]EtPt =
a1a3✓1
Z
P ⇤ +
a1a3
Z
EtPt+2 + ⇣[↵
⇤P xt +  
⇤P ft + (1  ↵⇤    ⇤)Pmt ].
The weights assigned to sectoral inflation in the relation describing inflation expectations
are now more easily interpreted.
If it were to be assumed that expectations simply reflect past inflation, calculated
using expenditure shares, then
[5]EtPt+1 = Pt
and
[6]Pt = AP
x
t +BP
f
t + (1 A B)Pmt .
[5] and [6] show that
[6.1]EtPt+1 = AP
x
t +BP
f
t + (1 A B)Pmt .
Although [5] is not used in the model, this very simplistic assumption allows comparison
between the sectoral weights used in the calculation of inflation expectations arrived
at through our model and those that are based simply on expenditure share. The
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relative weights assigned to inflation in the three sectors, found within our model, are
not typically equal to the sectors share in expenditure. To see this compare
AP xt +BP
f
t + (1 A B)Pmt
from [6.1] and
↵⇤P xt +  
⇤P ft + (1  ↵⇤    ⇤)Pmt ,
from [16] where
↵⇤ =
 A
1  a2 , 
⇤ =
 B
1  a2 .
The weights ↵⇤ and  ⇤ are the relative weights that economic agents ought to
place on the sectoral rates of inflation in the food and energy sectors in order to form
optimum and rational expectations of future inflation. ⇣ can be thought of as the actual
inflation elasticity of expectations, which is less than one ”because agents do not expect
a fully accommodating monetary policy.”5 The direction and magnitude of the bias in
weights is dependent on the values of the parameters of the model.6
In conclusion, the relative weights placed on the recent behavior of food and energy
prices, in general, are not equal to the expenditure shares for the energy and food sectors.
More specifically, if energy (food) prices and manufacturing prices are determined in
fundamentally di↵erent ways, and if these sectoral inflation rates di↵er, then
”rational agents should form their expectations by combining sectoral in-
flation rates using relative weights that generally di↵er from expenditure
shares.”7
5Van Duyne, 1982, p. 423
6The special case in which ↵⇤ = A or  ⇤ = B occurs when   + a2 = 1 or   + a2 = 1. Recall that a2
represents the degree of inertia in the wage formation process and that 0 < a2 < 1. A smaller value
for the parameter a2 implies more sluggish adjustments of wage inflation to changes in expectations or
changes in demand.   and   represent the degree to which price movements in the energy and food
sectors are serially correlated, respectively. Higher values of   and   indicate that future temporary
disturbances in the energy and food sectors are determined more by pervious temporary disturbances in
the energy and food sectors. This case is not generally the case, and the case where ↵⇤ = A and  ⇤ = B
requires   =  .
7Van Duyne, 1982, p. 424
RATIONAL BIAS IN INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 15
Thus, it has been illustrated that, in contrast to the simplistic frequency of interaction
view of the BEH, it is Muth rational for expectations of inflation to be biased away from
the sectoral shares in expenditure, used to calculate actual inflation. The issue of actual
bias realized in inflation expectations will next be assessed.
4. Rational Weighting Empirical Analysis
4.1. Overview. This section addresses the question of whether, when forming expecta-
tions of inflation, individuals, in practice, bias the weights they rationally arrive at for
inflation in the food and energy sectors away from the sectors respective shares in con-
sumer expenditure. This section outlines the empirical analysis we have done along with
the econometric obstacles we encountered. Analysis here specifically addresses whether
the professional economists surveyed by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank bias the
relative weights assigned to sectoral inflation, for the food and energy sectors, in the
formation of their expectations for movements in the CPI.
Our empirical analysis includes estimation of actual weights placed on sectoral
inflation through regression analysis and testing for bias in these weights, above or
below those weights reflecting expenditure share.
4.2. Regression Analysis. Given the algebraic result of the theoretical model for in-
flation expectations one period in the future,
[15]EtPt+1 =
a1a3✓1
Z
P ⇤ +
a1a3
Z
EtPt+2+
 A(1 + a3✓2)
Z
P xt +
 B(1 + a3✓2)
Z
P ft +
(1  a2    A   B)(1 + a3✓2)
Z
Pmt ,
we estimate analogous equations to see if expectations are in fact rationally weighted.
Hence, we estimate equations of the form
[17]EtPt+1 = ↵0 + ↵1P
⇤ + ↵2EtPt+2 + ↵3PXt + ↵4PFt + ↵5POt + ut.
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In [17], EtPt+1 represents expectations of inflation in period t for period t + 1, P ⇤
represents the monetary authority’s long term target for inflation (assumed to be 2%),
EtPt+2 represents expectations of inflation in period t for period t + 2, PXt represents
inflation in the energy sector, PFt represents inflation in the food sector, POt represents
core inflation, and ut is an error term. Here we use core inflation (headline inflation less
inflation in the food and energy sectors) in place of inflation in the manufacturing sector
because in the theoretical model sectoral inflation in the manufacturing sector should
be interpreted as inflation in the economy outside that in the food and energy sectors.
Both inflation in the manufacturing sector in the theoretical model and core inflation
in the empirical model are rates of inflation for all consumer expenditures other than
food and energy. Also, the target for inflation reflects the implicit target for inflation
used by the Federal Reserve System, 2%. All other variables we use in the estimation of
equations of form similar to [17] should be interpreted in the same manner as above.
4.3. Relating Theory and Empirics. To see the relationship between the theoretical
model and the empirical model, which allows for testing for bias in the weights assigned
to sectoral inflation rates, recall the following equations:
[17]EtPt+1 = ↵0 + ↵1P
⇤ + ↵2EtPt+2 + ↵3PXt + ↵4PFt + ↵5POt + ut,
[16]EtPt+1 =
a1a3✓1
Z
P ⇤ +
a1a3
Z
EtPt+2 + ⇣[↵
⇤P xt +  
⇤P ft + (1  ↵⇤    ⇤)Pmt ].
[17] is the general equation to be estimated empirically and [16] is the final algebraic
result of the theoretical model that allows for easy interpretation of sectoral weights.
Comparison of these equations shows that
↵3 ⌘ ⇣↵⇤,↵4 ⌘ ⇣ ⇤,↵5 ⌘ ⇣(1  ↵⇤    ⇤).
Thus,
⇣ ⌘ ↵3 + ↵4 + ↵5 =) ↵⇤ ⌘ ↵3
↵3 + ↵4 + ↵5
, ⇤ ⌘ ↵4
↵3 + ↵4 + ↵5
.
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The relation between weights in theory and empirics is now clear: the coe cients in the
estimated equation can be combined to estimate the optimal weights assigned to the
sectoral rates of inflation from the theoretical model. Further, we now see explicitly how
⇣ can be interpreted as an elasticity: ⇣ ⌘ ↵3 + ↵4 + ↵5 represents the e↵ect of a one
percentage point increase in actual inflation on expected inflation.
4.4. Testing for Bias. The results of the regression analysis are tested to see whether
the relative weights placed on food, energy, and core inflation di↵er from the respective
shares in consumer expenditures in a statistically and/or economically significant way.
This is testing of the BEH. For such testing, the following null hypotheses are used.
Energy Sector:
[18]H0 : ↵
⇤ ⌘ ↵3
↵3 + ↵4 + ↵5
= A.
Food Sector:
[19]H0 :  
⇤ ⌘ ↵4
↵3 + ↵4 + ↵5
= B.
Again, ↵⇤ is the relative weight agents place on inflation in the energy sector and  ⇤
is the relative weight agents place on inflation in the food sector; A is a fixed weight
taking its value from the energy sector’s share of consumer expenditure and B is a fixed
weight taking its value from the food sector’s share of consumer expenditure. Further,
equations [18] and [19] allow for the following equations:
[20](1 A)↵3  A↵4  A↵5 = 0, [21](1 B)↵4  B↵3  B↵5 = 0.
These linear combinations of estimated coe cients are what is actually tested statisti-
cally. Thus, the empirical methodology for testing the BEH for both the food and energy
sectors has been described.
4.5. Econometric Issues. A few econometric issues are necessary to confront in the
estimation of these equations. First, coe cients will only be estimated for equations
with a one period lag. This mirrors Van Duyne’s analysis, as all coe cients he estimated
for equations using data with lags of two or more periods were found to be small and
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insignificant. Second, there is a strong possibility that expectations for inflation two
periods in the future, EtPt+2, (an independent explanatory variable) are correlated with
the error term, ut. One could write an equation for EtPt+2 similar to [17] that includes,
as an explanatory variable, inflation expectations for three periods in the future, EtPt+3.
This would mean that the coe cients to be estimated would su↵er from omitted variable
bias since EtPt+3 is missing from [17]. As such, the technique of instrumental variables
is necessary to correct for this potential bias. The instruments that were chosen include
the lagged unemployment gap, lagged overall inflation, lagged employment cost index,
and lagged average hourly wage. Each of these is likely to be correlated with EtPt+2 but
not with ut from [17], if lagged two or more periods. Thus, these are useful instrumental
variables. With these instruments lagged two periods, Instrumental Variable Two Stage
Least Squares estimation is performed in place of Ordinary Least Squares estimation.
4.6. Data. We analyze data from the period of 1980 through 2012. Analysis involves
estimation of equations of the form [17] using data from multiple time intervals. This is
necessary as the food and energy sectors’ shares in consumer expenditure change over
the three decade interval. Thus, to pickup any periods with potentially larger biases
we calculate the average expenditure shares over di↵erent periods of time and test the
estimated coe cients for those periods against these. data used is quarterly observations;
therefore, one period is equivalent to one quarter.
As stated above, the expectations of inflation used in the regression analysis is
quarterly inflation expectations for headline CPI from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve
Bank’s survey of professional economists. This data is available for one to four quarters
in the future. The analysis uses expectations for one and two quarters in the future.
Observed price data is taken in quarterly form from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The headline (overall) Consumer Price Index is used to calculate overall inflation, Core
CPI is used to calculate core inflation, CPI Energy is used to calculate inflation in the
energy sector, and CPI Food is used to calculate inflation in the food sector.
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Coe cients estimated for each time interval are tested against the average of ex-
penditure shares for the appropriate sector, energy or food, during that interval as
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. When looking at the entire period, both the
most recent expenditure share data, mirroring Van Duynes paper, and overall averages
are used.
Finally, the data used for instrumental variables includes be lagged overall CPI,
lagged Employment Cost Index, both from the BLS, average hourly wages, and the
lagged di↵erence between the Unemployment Rate and the Natural Rate of Unemploy-
ment, NROU (an estimate of the natural rate from the Congressional Budget O ce).
The results of this analysis are discussed below.
5. Naive Weighting Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
The naive weighting view of biased expectations analyzes whether the weights
that individuals place on sectoral inflation rates for the food and energy sectors, when
forming inflation expectations, are simply taken as the same sectors0 share in consumer
expenditure. If it were to be assumed that expectations simply reflect past inflation,
calculated using expenditure shares, then (as described previously)
[5]EtPt+1 = Pt
and
[6]Pt = AP
x
t +BP
f
t + (1 A B)Pmt .
[5] and [6] show that
[6.1]EtPt+1 = AP
x
t +BP
f
t + (1 A B)Pmt .
This very simplistic assumption allows sectoral weights used in the formation of ex-
pectations for inflation to be based simply on expenditure shares. This view does not
incorporate any economic theory outside general intuition. As such, we empirically
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model inflation expectations as,
[21]EtPt+1 = h+ iPXt + jPFt + kPOt + ut,
where EtPt+1 is expectations in period t for inflation in period t + 1, PXt is inflation
in the energy sector in period t, PFt is inflation in the food sector in period t, POt is
inflation other than in the food and energy sectors in period t, and i and j are less than
1 and are the shares individuals actually assign to sectoral inflation. This equation gives
inflation expectations one period in the future as a function of inflation in the energy
sector, the food sector, and the rest of the economy. Therefore, estimation of i and j
through regression analysis allows us to test the hypotheses (the linear combinations
that follow are actually tested):
Energy Sector:
[22]H0 : i = A
[22.1]A  i = 0
Food Sector:
[23]H0 : j = B
[23.1]B   j = 0
where A and B are the energy and food sectors0 share in consumer expenditure,
respectively. In this way we determine whether consumers bias their expectations for
inflation with respect to the food and energy sectors in the simplistic way. The data used
for inflation expectations comes from the University of Michigan’s survey of consumers’
expectations for inflation one quarter in the future. The data for sectoral inflation and
core inflation is the same BLS data for the CPI as above.
We also use the expectations data from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank of
economists0 inflation expectations to check that the economists do not naively weight
sectoral inflation rates when forming their expectations.
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6. Results
6.1. Rational Weighting Empirical Results. Here we test whether individuals bias
the rational weights given by our theoretical model for sectoral inflation rates as they play
into the formation of inflation expectations. As outlined above, we estimate equations of
the form [17] by using Instrumental Variables in a Two Stage Least Squares regression
context. The elements of the set of regressions we run vary, as mentioned above, by the
time interval of the data we use to regress expectations for inflation one period in the
future on the explanatory variables and instruments. This allows us to capture changes
in the expenditure shares of the food and energy sectors in the CPI while maintaining a
large enough number of observations to get meaningful results from regression analysis.
The expenditure share averages we used are listed in Table 1; the shares for the food
and energy sectors in consumer expenditure vary roughly from 12% to 15% and from
6% to 9%, respectively.
Table 1. Expenditure Share Averages
Time Period Average Food Share Average Energy Share
2011 0.129926567 0.09365255
1984  2011 0.137648059 0.076796152
1984  1989 0.147723517 0.082601995
1990  2000 0.140413309 0.069559561
2001  2011 0.129387103 0.08086592
1984  1997 0.144568597 0.076087921
1998  2011 0.13072752 0.077504383
The specific time periods were 1983-1989 tested against expenditure share averages
for 1984-1989, 1990-2000 tested against expenditure share averages for 1990-2000, 2001-
2012 tested against expenditure share averages for 2001-2011, 1983-1997 tested against
expenditure share averages for 1984-1997, 1998-2012 tested against expenditure share
averages for 1998-2011, 1983-2012 tested against expenditure share averages for 1984-
2011, and 1983-2012 tested against expenditure shares for 2011. Restrictions in the
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data required the slight mismatch of regression data from expenditure share averages.8
The time periods break the overall period into rough thirds, halves, and a single whole.
We test the coe cients we get from instrumental variables regression analysis against
these expenditure share averages according to hypotheses [18] and [19]. The linear
combinations we use to approximate ↵⇤ and  ⇤, the rational weights implied through
our model for inflation in the energy and food sectors, are derived above. The actual
equations tested were of the forms [20] and [21]. The p-values resulting from the tests
of these hypotheses are included in Table 2. The test that is run is a one tailed  2
test. The results we present in Table 2 are the probabilities of getting a statistic at least
as extreme, in the  2 distribution with the appropriate degrees of freedom, as the one
observed from the data.
Table 2. Rational Weighting  2 Test Results (Philadelphia Fed Expec-
tations Data)
Time Period Energy Test P-Value Food Test P-Value Joint Test P-Value
2011 0.9412 0.1376 0.2954
1983  2012 0.6840 0.1310 0.2240
1983  1989 0.9673 0.7361 0.9433
1990  2000 0.8920 0.5687 0.7824
2001  2012 0.1920 0.1867 0.0725
1983  1997 0.6412 0.6707 0.8205
1998  2012 0.1373 0.2339 0.0489
We find that we are not able to reject all hypotheses, tested separately, at the
10% level. We then investigate whether the hypotheses occur at the same time by
running joint hypothesis tests for both the energy and food hypotheses for all time
periods. We find that we are not able to reject all joint hypotheses at the 10% level,
except for 2001 to 2012 and 1998 to 2012. Still we cannot reject the joint hypothesis
at the 5% level for 2001 to 2012. It may be that in the latter portion of the period
there was a particularly stable inflation overall and therefore more naive weighting of
sectoral inflation rates in the format of overall inflation expectations was passable. These
8Expenditure share data was available from the BLS only back until 1984 and up to 2011; while the
dataset used in our regression analysis spanned 1983 to 2012.
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results indicate that the weights used to form inflation expectations by the economists
surveyed by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank are rational; however, they do not
di↵er from the sectoral shares in consumer expenditure in a statistically significant way.
The weights are rational in that they are arrived at through our model that incorporates
serial correlation of sectoral price shocks. We discuss these implications further in the
concluding section.
6.2. Naive Weighting Empirical Results. Here we investigate whether economists
and typical consumers simply take a simple weighted average of sectoral expenditure
shares to form their inflation expectations, call this naive weighting. As the naive
weighting model we develop does not include the term for expectations two periods
in the future, this model requires only Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis to
estimate equations of the form [21]. Similarly to the rational empirical analysis, we use
run a set of regressions for di↵erent time periods. These are the same time periods as
in the rational weighting case; thus the average shares in consumer expenditure for the
food and energy sectors are again those from Table 1. As mentioned above, we run these
simple regressions using both consumer inflation expectation data from the University
of Michigan (to see if consumers naively weight inflation in di↵erent sectors when form-
ing inflation expectations) and inflation expectation data from the Philadelphia Federal
reserve Bank (to see if economists naively weight inflation in di↵erent sectors when form-
ing inflation expectations). We test the coe cients we get from OLS regression analysis
against the expenditure share averages according to hypotheses [22] and [23]. The actual
tests conducted were of the forms [22.1] and [23.1]. The p-values resulting from the tests
of these hypotheses are described in Table 3 for the University of Michigan consumer
expectations data and in Table 4 for the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank economist
expectations data. The test that is run for both sets of regression results is a F test.
The results we present in Table 3 and Table 4 are the probabilities of getting a statistic
at least as extreme, in the F distribution, as the one observed from the data.
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Table 3. Naive Weighting F Test Results (University of Michigan Ex-
pectations Data)
Time Period Energy Test P-Value Food Test P-Value Joint Test P-Value
2011 0.0000 0.0326 0.0000
1983  2012 0.0000 0.0139 0.0000
1983  1989 0.0000 0.0659 0.0000
1990  2000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000
2001  2012 0.0000 0.4203 0.0000
1983  1997 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000
1998  2012 0.0000 0.4945 0.0000
For the University of Michigan consumer inflation expectation data, we find that
we reject all hypotheses for the energy sector at any level of significance; however, we
can only reject the food hypotheses for 2011, 1983-2012, 1990-2000, and 1983-1997 at the
5% level. We are able to reject 1983-1989 at the 10% level, but are not able to reject the
hypotheses for 2001-2012 nor 1998-2012 at all. We again run tests of the hypotheses for
the food and energy jointly to see if we are able to reject the hypotheses that individuals
naively weight inflation expectations with respect to both the food and energy sectors
at the same time. We are able to reject all joint hypotheses. These results suggest
that consumers do not weight sectoral inflation in a naive way when forming inflation
expectations.
Table 4. Naive Weighting F Test Results (Philadelphia Fed Expecta-
tions Data)
Time Period Energy Test P-Value Food Test P-Value Joint Test P-Value
2011 0.0000 0.0057 0.0000
1983  2012 0.0000 0.0038 0.0000
1983  1989 0.0044 0.5922 0.0100
1990  2000 0.0000 0.0921 0.0000
2001  2012 0.0000 0.0243 0.0000
1983  1997 0.0000 0.2385 0.0000
1998  2012 0.0000 0.0115 0.0000
For the Philadelphia Federal Reserve inflation expectation data, we find that we
reject all hypotheses for the energy sector at any level of significance; however, we can
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only reject the food hypotheses for 2011, 1983-2012, 2001-2012, and 1998-2012 at the
5% level. We are able to reject 1990-2000 at the 10% level, but are not able to reject the
hypotheses for 1983-1989 nor 1983-1997 at all. We again run joint tests and are able to
reject all joint hypotheses. These results suggest that economists do not weight sectoral
inflation in a naive way when forming inflation expectations. We analyze these results in
combination with the results of the rational weighting analysis further in the following
section.
7. Conclusion
The project of this paper was to analyze whether individuals0 inflation expectations
were biased during the period from 1983 to 2012. That is, we sought to test whether
it is the case that individuals use relative weights for sectoral inflation rates that di↵er
from the sectors0 respective shares in consumer expenditure, when forming expectations
for headline inflation. This, as stated above, is the crux of the Biased Expectations
Hypothesis, that is held to be true by many policy makers. The BEH states that
recent price movements in certain sectors play special or emphasized roles in individuals
inflation expectations. We focus on analysis of the BEH within a theoretical framework
that produces rational weighting for individuals0 inflation expectations. Further, this
framework allows the possibility for these weights to be biased while being rationally
formed.
Because data about consumer expectations for inflation that satisfies the needs
of the theoretical framework developed in the previous sections (i.e. expectations data
for two periods in the future) is unavailable from the University of Michigan survey
of consumers, we use data collected by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank about
the multi period inflation expectations of professional economists. We recognize that it
is likely that the expectations of professional economists are more Muth rational than
those of consumers, as understanding economic theory is their profession. However, it
is reasonable to think that consumers are not ignorant of basic economic thinking and
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that their expectations for inflation would not be drastically di↵erent than those of the
economists, when presented with price movements. In particular, the serial correlation
of price shocks to the food and energy sectors is fairly intuitive and could be reasonably
assumed to factor into consumers0 formation of inflation expectations. Further, the focus
of our empirical analysis is on whether the expectations that economists form are biased,
in the way we have outlined. Understanding this and recognizing that typical consumers
are, again, not oblivious to economic theory and general macroeconomic intuition, we
can understand how it is that consumers do weight their inflations, assuming they are
somewhat Muth rational.
We conducted empirical analysis to investigate whether individuals do bias their
expectations, given rational formation of expectations. Using data from the period
from 1983 to 2012, we looked at whether economists surveyed by the Philadelphia Fed-
eral Reserve Bank biased their headline inflation expectations and whether these same
economists and consumers naively biased their inflation expectations. Combining pieces
of analysis, we may be able to say something about whether consumers bias the weights
they assign to sectoral inflation rates in their formation of headline inflation expectations.
The rationally weighted results suggest that when economists form inflation ex-
pectations rationally they do not form them with a statistically significant bias with
respect to inflation in both the food and the energy sectors. Our theoretical model im-
plies that the weights used to form inflation expectations by the economists surveyed by
the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank are rational; however, our results indicate that
these weights do not di↵er from the sectoral shares in consumer expenditure. Further
as conventional wisdom suggests, the results of the naive weighting analysis indicate
that economists and typical consumers do not simply use a weighted average of sectoral
expenditure shares to form their inflation expectations. 9 This result suggests that both
groups do something more sophisticated to form their inflation expectations, though this
is di cult to test directly. If it is the case that typical consumers are forming inflation
9The coe cients on sectoral inflation rates from the naive weighting analysis are typically smaller than
the sectoral expenditure shares.
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expectations in a manner similar to that described by our model, then we could reason-
ably conclude that consumers, like the economists we were able to analyze more fully,
do not bias their inflation expectations.
This result has important consequences for policy makers. If the BEH is not
credible then policy makers should not emphasize recent movements of prices in the
food and energy sectors when making policy decisions. Instead, as many policy makers
already do, measures of inflation that exclude these highly variable sectoral inflation
rates ought to be emphasized.
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